September 29, 2004
From the Senate floor
Keeping Hopelessness in Iraq alive
In many places in Iraq today, it is too
dangerous to go out even with guards.
The streets are so dangerous that some
parents are apparently keeping their
children home from school, afraid they
will be kidnapped, or worse, along the
way.
The State Department does not attempt
to conceal the truth about the
danger, at least in its travel warnings.
Its September 17 advisory states that
Iraq remains very dangerous.
At the end of August, a bloody 3-
week battle in Najaf ended with an
agreement that U.S. troops would give
up the city. Fallujah and now other
cities are no-go zones for our troops,
presumably to avoid even greater casualties,
until after the election.
Those are not the only areas where
we have lost control. Last Friday, Secretary
Powell said:
We don?t have government control, or government
control is inadequate, in Samarra,
Ramadi, Erbil and a number of other places.
We continue to use so-called precision
bombing in Iraq, even though our
bombs cannot tell whether it is terrorists
or innocent families inside the
buildings they destroy.
What is helping to unite so many
Iraqi people in hatred of America is
this emerging sense that America is
unwilling, not just unable, to rebuild
their shattered country and provide for
their basic needs. Far from sharing
President Bush?s unrealistic rosy view,
they see close up that their hopes for
peace and stability are receding every
day.
Inevitably, more and more Iraqis believe
that attacks on American forces
are acceptable, even if they would not
resort to violence themselves. For
every mistake we make, for every innocent
Iraqi child we accidentally kill
in another bombing raid, the ranks of
the insurgents climb, and so does their
fanatical determination to stop at
nothing to drive us out.
An Army reservist described the deteriorating
situation this way:
For every guerrilla we kill with a smart
bomb, we kill many more innocent civilians
and create rage and anger in the Iraqi community.
This rage and anger translates into
more recruits for the terrorists and less support
for us.
The Iraqi people?s anger is also fueled
by the persistent blackouts, the power
shortages, the lack of electricity, the
destroyed infrastructure, the relentless
violence, the massive lack of jobs and
basic necessities and services.
By any reasonable standard, our policy
is failing in Iraq. The President
should level with the American people.
He should take off his rose-colored
glasses, understand the truth, and tell
the truth. The American people and
our soldiers in Iraq deserve answers to
the questions they have about the war:
Will President Bush come to the Presidential
debate tomorrow prepared to
answer the hard questions? Will he
admit that we are on a catastrophic
path in Iraq? Will he admit that we
rushed to a $200 billion war with no
plan to win the peace? Will he offer a
concrete plan to correct our course?
We are steadily losing ground in the
war. No amount of campaign spin can
obscure those facts. We have to do better.
November 2 is our chance. This
President had his chance in Iraq. We
deserve a new call, and I believe we
will have it on November 2.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SMITH). The Senator from Arizona has
14 minutes 15 seconds.
f
IRAQ
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am going
to respond to my colleague from Massachusetts.
He has made a pretty vicious
attack, I would say, on the President
of the United States, contending
that he has not leveled with the American
people, that he has to begin telling
the truth about what is going on in
Iraq. These are very serious charges,
and I would like to try to respond to
them.
The Senator from Massachusetts
began by a recitation of why, in his
view, ??the outlook is so bleak,?? to use
his quotation, and why he concluded
that ??we?re losing the war,?? another
quotation from the Senator.
I see in the Senator?s remarks, and
others that I have heard recently, a
steely determination to keep hopelessness
alive. I do not think that should
be the policy of the United States. The
President has a much better vision
about how to bring the war against
militant Islam to a conclusion.
There were no constructive alternatives,
as my colleagues will recall,
from the comments of the Senator
from Massachusetts. There were no
ideas about how we could do better. It
was just an attack on the President
and an assertion that we are losing the
war, the implications of which were
left hanging.
When he said the President has this
attitude of shooting first and asking
questions later, then perhaps we need
to recall that we have already been attacked.
We did not shoot first. We were
attacked viciously on 9/11 and it
changed everything about our approach
to the war against militant Islam.
Secondly, when the Senator from
Massachusetts accuses the President of
painting a rosy picture and then refers
to the National Intelligence Estimate
that predicted some pretty dire consequences,
he forgets two things. First,
President Bush has said repeatedly
from the very beginning that this
would be a very long and difficult conflict.
He has never wavered from that.
In fact, he has tried to inspire the
American people to continue to persevere
in this war.
One does not inspire people by wringing
their hands and talking about how
we are losing the war. Think about
what kind of a message that sends to
the troops and to the families who are
sacrificing, to a mom who gets notice
that her young son has been killed in
Iraq: We are losing the war. It is hopeless.
The outlook is bleak.
Well, what are we fighting for? What
kind of a message does it send to our
allies, who some people say they could
convince to come into this conflict, we
are losing the war, now please come in?
That is not exactly going to persuade
them to come into the conflict.
Finally, and most importantly, what
kind of a message does it send to the
enemy to suggest that they are winning
and we are losing? Major political
figures in this country argue that we
are losing the war. It gives confidence
to the enemies. That is exactly what
they want to hear. Osama bin Laden
has said we are the weak horse and he
is the strong horse. If we convey that
message to him, we increase the possibility
that he will continue to think he
can win and that he will continue to
engage in this fight.
We need to break his will. He is testing
our will and comments such as this
are not helpful to challenging the
American people to continue to persevere
in this contest.
The question is about the American
will, and I do not think the comments
we heard from the Senator from Massachusetts
are going to be effective in
helping to sustain that will. I rather
think the approach that Winston
Churchill took in World War II accentuating
the positive, yes, but not ignoring
the negative and challenging
the British people and the people of the
Allies to persevere in that war is the
right approach, and that is what President
Bush has tried to do.
The Senator from Massachusetts has
confused a couple of issues. First, he
confuses violence in Iraq with less security
at home. I do not think we are
less secure at home because there is violence
in Iraq. In fact, one of the reasons
we have not been attacked at
home for over 3 years is because we
have taken the fight to the enemy and
we have largely been successful. We
have not lost a battle in this war.
There are battles yet to be fought,
and the enemy attacks us with guerilla
tactics, but we can persevere and win
militarily. So I do not think we should
confuse the fact that there is violence
in Iraq and therefore conclude we are
less secure at home. That is simply not
true.
Secondly, the Senator from Massachusetts
alleges that there was no relationship,
no connection, between the
terrorists and the Saddam Hussein regime.
I want to try to debunk this
myth right now, so let me quote from
the CIA, from the 9/11 Commission, and
from George Tenet?s assessment since
we are going to be quoting the National
Intelligence Estimate. This is
what the head of the CIA, George
Tenet, said:
Our understanding of the relationship between
Iraq and al-Qaida is evolving and is
based on sources of varying reliability. Some
of the information we have received comes
from detainees, including some of high rank.
We have solid reporting of senior level contacts
between Iraq and al-Qaida going back a
decade.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S9872 September 29, 2004
No relationship? According to the
CIA, not true.
Continuing to quote:
Credible information indicates that Iraq
and al-Qaida have discussed safe haven and
reciprocal nonaggression.
Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we
have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of
al-Qaida members, including some that have
been in Baghdad.
We have credible reporting that al-Qaida
leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could
help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting
also stated that Iraq has provided
training to al-Qaida members in the areas of
poisons and gases and making conventional
bombs.
Iraq?s increasing support to extremist Palestinians,
coupled with growing indications
of a relationship with al-Qaida, suggest that
Baghdad?s links to terrorists will increase,
even absent U.S. military action.
No relationship? No contacts? No
connection? Read the intelligence reports.
What did the 9/11 Commission say?
Quoting from Thomas Kean, cochair of
the 9/11 Commission:
There was no question in our minds that
there was a relationship between Iraq and Al
Qaeda.
Let us get the facts straight. If we
are going to come to the Senate floor
and charge the President of the United
States with misinforming the American
people, we need not misinform
them ourselves.
Quoting further from the 9/11 Commission
report:
With the Sudanese regime acting as an
intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with
senior Iraqi intelligence officers in Khartoum
in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is
said to have asked for space to establish
training camps, as well as assistance in procuring
weapons, but there is no evidence
that Iraq responded to this request . . . [but]
the ensuing years saw additional efforts to
establish connections.
That is from page 61 of the report.
From page 66:
In March 1998, after Bin Ladin?s public
fatwa against the United States, two Al
Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to
meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an
Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to
meet first with the Taliban and then with
Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps
both, of these meetings was apparently
arranged through Bin Ladin?s Egyptian deputy,
Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to
the Iraqis.
From page 66:
Similar meetings between Iraqi officials
and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred
in 1999 during a period of some reported
strains with the Taliban. According
to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin
Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined,
apparently judging that his circumstance
in Afghanistan remained more favorable
than the Iraqi alternative. The reports
describe friendly contacts and indicates
some common themes in both sides?
hatred of the United States. But to date we
have seen no evidence that these or the earlier
contacts ever developed into a collaborative
operational relationship. . . .
That is the critical distinction. We
have to be careful of our language, especially
when we are accusing the
President of the United States of misleading
the American people. Our language
matters. The President never alleged
an operational link or that Saddam
Hussein helped to plan the 9/11 attack
on the United States, but there is
plenty of evidence of connections between
bin Laden, al-Qaida, other terrorists
and Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
The Intelligence Committee report in
July of this year reported:
[F]rom 1996 to 2003, the Iraqi Intelligence
Service ??focused its terrorist activities on
Western interests, particularly against the
U.S. and Israel.
They go on to quote the letter from
George Tenet that I quoted before.
[A]ccording to a CIA report called Iraqi
Support for Terrorism, ??the general pattern
that emerges is one of al Qaeda?s enduring
interest in acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) expertise
from Iraq.??
This is exactly what Senator MCCAIN
talked about a few weeks ago, what the
President has talked about, what the
Vice President has talked about, our
concern of this relationship that would
some day, if we did not act against
Iraq, blossom into fullblooded support,
full-blown support from Iraq to al-
Qaida.
Finally:
[T]he Iraqi regime ??certainly?? had knowledge
that Abu Musab al Zarqawi?described
in Iraqi Support for Terrorism as ??a senior
al Qaeda terrorist planner???was operating
in Baghdad and northern Iraq.
I ask unanimous consent that a New
York Times article of June 25, 2004,
which further makes this point, be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[From the New York Times, June 25, 2004]
IRAQIS, SEEKING FOES OF SAUDIS, CONTACTED
BIN LADEN, FILE SAYS
(By Thom Shanker)
Contacts between Iraqi intelligence agents
and Osama bin Laden when he was in Sudan
in the mid 1990?s were part of a broad effort
by Baghdad to work with organizations opposing
the Saudi ruling family, according to
a newly disclosed document obtained by the
Americans in Iraq.
American officials described the document
as an internal report by the Iraqi intelligence
service detailing efforts to seek cooperation
with several Saudi opposition
groups, including Mr. bin Laden?s organization,
before Al Qaeda had become a fullfledged
terrorist organization. He was based
in Sudan from 1992 to 1996, when that country
forced him to leave and he took refuge in
Afghanistan.
The document states that Iraq agreed to
rebroadcast anti-Saudi propaganda, and that
a request from Mr. bin Laden to begin joint
operations against foreign forces in Saudi
Arabia went unanswered. There is no further
indication of collaboration.
Last week, the independent commission investigating
the Sept. 11 attacks addressed
the known contacts between Iraq and Al
Qaeda, which have been cited by the White
House as evidence of a close relationship between
the two.
The commission concluded that the contacts
had not demonstrated ??a collaborative
relationship?? between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
The Bush administration responded that
there was considerable evidence of ties.
The new document, which appears to have
circulated only since April, was provided to
The New York Times several weeks ago, before
the commission?s report was released.
Since obtaining the document, The Times
has interviewed several military, intelligence
and United States government officials
in Washington and Baghdad to determine
that the government considered it authentic.
The Americans confirmed that they had
obtained the document from the Iraqi National
Congress, as part of a trove that the
group gathered after the fall of Saddam Hussein?s
government last year. The Defense Intelligence
Agency paid the Iraqi National
Congress for documents and other information
until recently, when the group and its
leader, Ahmad Chalabi, fell out of favor in
Washington.
Some of the intelligence provided by the
group is now wholly discredited, although officials
have called some of the documents it
helped to obtain useful.
A translation of the new Iraqi document
was reviewed by a Pentagon working group
in the spring, officials said. It included senior
analysts from the military?s Joint Staff,
the Defense Intelligence Agency and a joint
intelligence task force that specialized in
counterterrorism issues, they said.
The task force concluded that the document
??appeared authentic,?? and that it
??corroborates and expands on previous reporting??
about contacts between Iraqi intelligence
and Mr. bin Laden in Sudan, according
to the task force?s analysis.
It is not known whether some on the task
force held dissenting opinions about the document?s
veracity.
At the time of the contacts described in
the Iraqi document, Mr. bin Laden was little
known beyond the world of national security
experts. It is now thought that his associates
bombed a hotel in Yemen used by American
troops bound for Somalia in 1992. Intelligence
officials also believe he played a role
in training Somali fighters who battled
Army Rangers and Special Operations forces
in Mogadishu during the ??Black Hawk
Down?? battle of 1993.
Iraq during that period was struggling with
its defeat by American-led forces in the Persian
Gulf war of 1991, when American troops
used Saudi Arabia as the base for expelling
Iraqi invaders from Kuwait.
The document details a time before any of
the spectacular anti-American terrorist
strikes attributed to Al Qaeda: the two
American Embassy bombings in East Africa
in 1998, the strike on the destroyer Cole in
Yemeni waters in 2000, and the Sept. 11 attacks.
The document, which asserts that Mr. bin
Laden ??was approached by our side,?? states
that Mr. bin Laden previously ??had some
reservations about being labeled an Iraqi operative,??
but was now willing to meet in
Sudan, and that ??presidential approval?? was
granted to the Iraqi security service to proceed.
At the meeting, Mr. bin Laden requested
that sermons of an anti-Saudi cleric be rebroadcast
in Iraq. That request, the document
states, was approved by Baghdad.
Mr. bin Laden ??also requested joint operations
against foreign forces?? based in Saudi
Arabia, where the American presence has
been a rallying cry for Islamic militants who
oppose American troops in the land of the
Muslim pilgrimage sites of Mecca and Medina.
But the document contains no statement
of response by the Iraqi leadership under Mr.
Hussein to the request for joint operations,
and there is no indication of discussions
about attacks on the United States or the
use of unconventional weapons.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S9873 September 29, 2004
The document is of interest to American
officials as a detailed, if limited, snapshot of
communications between Iraqi intelligence
and Mr. bin Laden, but this view ends with
Mr. bin Laden?s departure from Sudan. At
that point, Iraqi intelligence officers began
??seeking other channels through which to
handle the relationship, in light of his current
location,?? the document states.
Members of the Pentagon task force that
reviewed the document said it described no
formal alliance being reached between Mr.
bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence. The Iraqi
document itself states that ??cooperation between
the two organizations should be allowed
to develop freely through discussion
and agreement.??
The heated public debate over links between
Mr. bin Laden and the Hussein government
fall basically into three categories: the
extent of communications and contacts between
the two, the level of actual cooperation,
and any specific collaboration in the
Sept. 11 attacks.
The document provides evidence of communications
between Mr. bin Laden and
Iraqi intelligence, similar to that described
in the Sept. 11 staff report released last
week.
??Bin Laden also explored possible cooperation
with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite
his opposition to Hussein?s secular regime,??
the Sept. 11 commission report stated.
The Sudanese government, the commission
report added, ??arranged for contacts between
Iraq and Al Qaeda.??
??A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly
made three visits to Sudan,?? it said, ??finally
meeting bin Laden in 1994. Bin Laden is
said to have requested space to establish
training camps, as well as assistance in procuring
weapons, but Iraq apparently never
responded.??
The Sept. 11 commission statement said
there were reports of further contacts with
Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan after Mr.
bin Laden?s departure from Sudan, ??but they
do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative
relationship,?? it added.
After the Sept. 11 commission released its
staff reports last week, President Bush and
Vice President Dick Cheney said they remained
convinced that Mr. Hussein?s government
had a long history of ties to Al Qaeda.
??This administration never said that the 9/
11 attacks were orchestrated between Saddam
and Al Qaeda,?? Mr. Bush said. ??We did
say there were numerous contacts between
Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. For example,
Iraqi intelligence officers met with bin
Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, in the Sudan.
There?s numerous contacts between the
two.??
It is not clear whether the commission
knew of this document. After its report was
released, Mr. Cheney said he might have
been privy to more information than the
commission had; it is not known whether
any further information has changed hands.
A spokesman for the Sept. 11 commission
declined to say whether it had seen the Iraqi
document, saying its policy was not to discuss
its sources.
The Iraqi document states that Mr. bin
Laden?s organization in Sudan was called
??The Advice and Reform Commission.?? The
Iraqis were cued to make their approach to
Mr. bin Laden in 1994 after a Sudanese official
visited Uday Hussein, the leader?s son,
as well as the director of Iraqi intelligence,
and indicated that Mr. bin Laden was willing
to meet in Sudan.
A former director of operations for Iraqi
intelligence Directorate 4 met with Mr. bin
Laden on Feb. 19 1995, the document states.
Mr. KYL. I note, concluding with this
point, that Abdul Yasim and Abu Nidal
were harbored in Iraq. The Taliban did
not directly involve itself in 9/11 or
have weapons of mass destruction either,
but it harbored people like this
and that is one reason we went after
the Taliban and Saddam Hussein?s regime
in Iraq.
With regard to the connections between
Iraq and al-Qaida, the case is
very clear that they were there and the
President stands correct, and I hope
the Senator from Massachusetts would
stand corrected.
Finally, as to the suggestion that
Iraq was a diversion from succeeding in
Afghanistan, that we have not finished
the job there, we were very successful
in defeating the Taliban and killing a
lot of al-Qaida and capturing a lot of
al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and in establishing
a regime there which will be
holding elections. Karzai made it very
clear when he came to this country and
expressed his appreciation, just as did
Prime Minister Allawi of Iraq, to
American forces for helping to provide
the Afghanis with enough freedom to
control their own future. I think there
is confusion that the only al-Qaida are
on the border between Afghan and
Pakistan, and since we have not captured
every single one of them, including
Osama bin Laden, therefore our activities
in Iraq are responsible for this
fact. There has been no evidence of
that. As a matter of fact, our military
commanders make the point it is not
true, that Iraq was not a diversion
from anything we had to do in Afghanistan
where we were very effective and
successful.
To those who convey this sense of
panic, that all is going bad, the opposite
of that is not those of us who support
the President?s policy saying everything
is rosy. I do not know that
anybody has ever used that phrase. If
they have, I would like to see it. The
President has said repeatedly that this
is a long and difficult war and it is
going to require a great deal of perseverance
and commitment by the American
people. But as contrasted by those
who create the sense of panic, the
President has a vision and the President?s
commanders have a strategy.
When I saw General Abizaid on television
last Sunday, he didn?t paint a
rosy picture. He painted a very realistic
assessment. But he also portrayed
a calm confidence that if we can persevere
we can prevail.
That is what he asked of the American
people, to allow the military commanders
as well as the Commander in
Chief to carry out the vision to defeat
the militant Islamic terrorists wherever
they are. As I said, they are not
only in Afghanistan; they are all over
the world including primarily in the
Middle East. That is why this war has
many fronts. It is not just Afghanistan.
We fought simultaneously to try to
gain support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
the Libyan regime, and from
Syria. We did what we did in Afghanistan.
We have done what we have done
in Iraq. There are still some places to
go, but we have also been in Yemen and
Sudan, and so on.
The bottom line here is you can?t isolate
one place in the world and say we
have to do that first and win every possible
goal there before we can do anything
else anywhere else. The President
has made it clear that by going to
one of the chief sources of terrorism,
namely Iraq, we can help to win this
war.
The fact that there was such a connection
between the terrorists?between
al-Qaida and the Iraqi regime?is
I think validated by the fact that they
have been able to so successfully continue
to attack Americans and American
forces in Iraq.
Let?s consider that the military commanders
just might know what they
are talking about, No. 1. No. 2, it does
no good to wring our hands and paint a
picture of panic. Realistic assessments,
absolutely; truth to the American people,
absolutely; but leadership that presents
a vision and a strategy for winning
the wider war on terrorism, that
is what the President has provided.
That is why I am very proud to support
President Bush?s efforts in this regard.
3
f
RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, leadership time is
reserved.
f
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM
ACT OF 2004
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senate will resume
consideration of S. 2845, which
the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2845) to reform the intelligence
community and the intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the U.S. Government,
and for other purposes.
Pending:
Wyden Amendment No. 3704, to establish
an Independent National Security Classification
Board in the executive branch.
Collins Amendment No. 3705, to provide for
homeland security grant coordination and
simplification.
Specter Amendment No. 3706, to provide
the National Intelligence Director with the
authority to supervise, direct, and control
all elements of the intelligence community
performing national intelligence missions.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator
from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the debate
now will resume on the amendment
offered by the Senator from
Pennsylvania. As discussed last night,
we have an informal agreement that
Senator ROBERTS would be recognized
for?is it 25 minutes, I ask Senator
ROBERTS?
Mr. ROBERTS. I thought the agreement
was 30.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I could not
hear the Senator from Maine. She said
there had been an order that the Senator
be recognized?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if I can
respond to the Democratic leader?s inquiry,
there was an informal discussion
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