You really need to concoct better straw men. The issue on Wall Street is two fold. First, there's the belief that so many of the Street elite didn't "earn" their money at all, but essentially stole it. Then there's the outrage that in the process of raping our economy they so screwed it up that it's on the verge of collapsing ... further enriching them through government handouts.
With respect to the first argument, if there is evidence of fraud I suggest the concerned parties present the evidence -- whether to the media or the proper regulators/authorities -- and, in effect, let the judicial process resolve the matter. I do not see the need to protest anything or traduce an entire sector of the economy for the ill-deeds of a few. Of course, I have the feeling that many of the protesters do not believe that they have committed any actual crimes for which the accused could be charged -- much less found guilty -- so instead they posit novel theories of criminality or infer criminality because banks or market participants enjoy high profit margins. I don't think either approach is all that persuasive.
With respect to the second claim, there are two claims with which I take issue:
a) Raping the Economy:
At bottom, the crisis was produced by a housing bubble. The housing bubble was caused by a confluence of factors ranging from the imprudence of Wall St. to governmental policy to monetary policy to personal avarice on the part of individuals.
To be sure, the bubble probably would not have been as large as it was absent the financial innovations used by Wall St. banks. Like all bubbles, however, the housing bubble would have eventually would have burst irrespective of any participation by Wall Street.
I would also suggest that the seize-up in markets and the true 'panic' period of Fall '08 to Winter '09 was also partially the fault of government taking a too interventionist role in the financial markets. Specifically, the government's inconsistency in handling the Bear and Lehman situations spooked the market (the government rescue of Bear also created expectations -- both within financial markets and the remaining banks themselves -- that were frustrated when the government refused to support Lehman). Lehman could have been wound-up like any business but the inconsistent policy of the government induced an irrational response by many market participants which created the run or panic that caused such harm. This is not to suggest that Dick Fuld was a good manager or that Lehman was well-run -- they were most certainly not. I think, however, you are not properly appreciating the effect of government policy and action can have on financial markets, transforming a minor blip into a serious problem.
b) Further Enriching them through Gov't Handouts:
All the banks that received assistance from the government during the Fall of '08 have repaid the money back; indeed, even BofA, which was not only poorly run pre-collapse but coerced by Fed and Treasury officials into assuming the toxic assets of Merill, had repaid the money it received. This speaks to the fact that, at a fundamental level, the problems experienced by the banks was one of liquidity; this fact doesn't entirely absolve banks of their imprudence but, at the same time, suggests that they were the victims of an irrational panic in parts of the financial sector that temporarily impeded their ability to raise operational funding (banks were especially hard-hit by the freeze-up in the MMF and repo markets as they rely on these markets for daily funding). Moreover, it should be noted a number of the banks that received TARP funding, including JP Morgan, did not want the money. Instead, Fed and Treasury required they take the money so as to not stigmatize the banks that had a genuine need for federal assistance.
Even AIG, which fell through the regulatory cracks and managed to assume a sub-optimal level of outstanding obligations has not actually cost the government that much money (indeed, the privatization of AIG might even turn a profit for the government). Here, I think this speaks to the fact that the theory on which the derivative and CDS trading was based was, on a fundamental level, sound. There were two problems with AIG -- one peculiar to AIG and one applicable to any company trading in securitized products of residential mortgages. As to the latter, there simply wasn't the data on correlation and other effects so that he rate of default couldn't accurately be predicted. Thus, banks had no way of knowing with any real sort of certainty the risk of default for the pool of assets that backed the securities they well selling.
As to the former, the risk models designed by AIG always assumed that the company would have a AAA credit rating -- when they lost it the models were turned on their head. Here again, the problem was simply one of liqudity, in that AIG never thought they would have to post substantial amounts of collateral despite their holding a huge notational sum of CDS contracts. Further driving home the point that this was a liquidity problem, hardly any (<10%) of the 'super-senior' tranches insured by AIG actually defaulted and required AIG to pay out on the CDS contract. The fundamental theory behind securitizations and collateralization worked -- it was merely the practical implementation that failed.